TenuredVulture wrote:I wonder if the train derailment and subsequent oil spill in W VA changes the conversation about the Keystone pipeline at all. I mean, I know it won't, because it's been years since that debate was about anything other than empty symbolism, but still.

jerseyhoya wrote:What ISIS Really Wants

This is really long. I learned a lot. I highly recommend reading it if one is interested.

Graeme Wood in Atlantic wrote:In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.

Soren wrote:

TenuredVulture wrote:I wonder if the train derailment and subsequent oil spill in W VA changes the conversation about the Keystone pipeline at all. I mean, I know it won't, because it's been years since that debate was about anything other than empty symbolism, but still.

Transporting oil by truck/train is worse for the environment than the pipeline if you exclude spills etc. The big question, aside from the probability of spills, pipe ruptures etc is should we be #$!&@ with tar sand oil in the first place.

drsmooth wrote:

jerseyhoya wrote:What ISIS Really Wants

This is really long. I learned a lot. I highly recommend reading it if one is interested.

Geez, I get to the end of the FIRST PARAGRAPH and already I'm reading this kind of gratuitious horseshit:

Graeme Wood in Atlantic wrote:In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.

That kind of insinuating cherry-picking BS wouldn't have passed Atlantic editors in years past. "Statements that reflected confusion about the group" - I seriously doubt it. If the purported spokesperson were prone to choking on snack foods, then maybe. The statements "May have contributed to significant strategic errors?" Trash-talking an opponent in a soundbite is going to "contribute to significant strategic errors" in what very particular way? A lot - too much - has been made of the jayvee team remark, and the POTUS shouldn't have bothered trying to walk back whether he was talking about ISIS or not. Wood is confusing messaging for strategy, and given his experience, it's not because he doesn't understand the difference, but rather because doing so fits his narrative.

I wanted to be eager to read this, but that kind of crap instead makes me eager to make fun of this guy's accent.

I'm no fan of Team Obama's foreign policy, generally or specifically, but if you have a case to make, don't lead it with flimsy foreshadowing crap like this.

If we had identified the Islamic State’s intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq’s third-largest city. Yet, just over a year ago, Obama told The New Yorker that he considered ISIS to be al-Qaeda’s weaker partner. “If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant,” the president said.

jerseyhoya wrote:I don't understand your complaint. It's not gratuitous horseshit or cherry-picking BS.

It's the central thesis of his piece that ISIS's goals, motivations, methods, etc. are radically different than anything we've come across previously, including from Al Qaeda.


The administration (or at least the president) viewing ISIS as Al Qaeda Lite was wrong in many different ways and reflected confusion about the group and may have contributed to significant strategic errors in confronting the challenges it presents.

House Speaker John Boehner said Sunday that he had asked Israeli Ambassador to Washington Ron Dermer not to inform the Obama administration about their contact over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Congress speech so as to avoid "interference."

"I wanted to make sure there is no interference," Boehner told Fox News' Sunday morning program. "There is no secret here about the animosity that this White House has for Netanyahu and I didn’t want them getting in the way and quashing what I thought was a real opportunity,” Boehner continued.

swishnicholson wrote:
I admit sometimes I have trouble following drsmooth's complaints, but this one here is as clear as KY Jelly.

Maqdisi [an al-Qaeda poohbah] gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State’s fans, and al‑Qaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology [a 3rd year PhD student of another authority Woods cites elsewhere in his artile], read Maqdisi’s opinion on Henning’s status and thought it would hasten his and other captives’ death. “If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn’t be killed,” he told me, “I’d kiss my ass goodbye.”

Kassig’s death was a tragedy, but the plan’s success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world’s two largest jihadist organizations. It’s possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America’s two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment. [So bringing al-Queda and ISIS together is bad. Hold that thought....]

....Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims’ front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.

One way to un-cast the Islamic State’s spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. Al‑Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. [So, despite Woods earlier concerns, no one can really "match-make" al Qaeda and ISIS, because they immediately confront a myriad of irreconcilable philosophical and operational differences. Hold that thought, again....]

Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover. [So boots on ISIS ground might be good. Hold that thought....]

Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.

And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. [So, boots on ISIS ground is probably very bad. Hold that -- oh fuck it, these aren't thoughts at all, are they?]

drsmooth wrote:Here's an example of Woods tail-chasing, presented as some kind of oracular strategic counsel. I've added a couple of explanatory remarks in brackets:

Maqdisi [an al-Qaeda poohbah] gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State’s fans, and al‑Qaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology [a 3rd year PhD student of another authority Woods cites elsewhere in his artile], read Maqdisi’s opinion on Henning’s status and thought it would hasten his and other captives’ death. “If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn’t be killed,” he told me, “I’d kiss my ass goodbye.”

Kassig’s death was a tragedy, but the plan’s success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world’s two largest jihadist organizations. It’s possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America’s two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment. [So bringing al-Queda and ISIS together is bad. Hold that thought....]

....Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims’ front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.

One way to un-cast the Islamic State’s spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. Al‑Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. [So, despite Woods earlier concerns, no one can really "match-make" al Qaeda and ISIS, because they immediately confront a myriad of irreconcilable philosophical and operational differences. Hold that thought, again....]

Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover. [So boots on ISIS ground might be good. Hold that thought....]

Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.

And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. [So, boots on ISIS ground is probably very bad. Hold that -- oh fuck it, these jumbled insinuations of Woods aren't really thoughts at all, are they?]

swishnicholson wrote:

jerseyhoya wrote:I don't understand your complaint. It's not gratuitous horseshit or cherry-picking BS.

It's the central thesis of his piece that ISIS's goals, motivations, methods, etc. are radically different than anything we've come across previously, including from Al Qaeda.


The administration (or at least the president) viewing ISIS as Al Qaeda Lite was wrong in many different ways and reflected confusion about the group and may have contributed to significant strategic errors in confronting the challenges it presents.

I admit sometimes I have trouble following drsmooth's complaints, but this one here is as clear as KY Jelly. I've helpfully split your response into three parts, the middle of which is true. The out-of-the-blue, out of context and irrelevantly cited "jayvee" comment is in fact gratuitous and cherry picking and doesn't relate to the central thesis (did you truly read the whole thing?) If you're going to do an overly long think-piece on the motives of ISIS and want to have it taken seriously, you need to do the work of actually representing the thought on its opponents in some depth as well, rather than just tossing potshots.

drsmooth wrote:Here's an example of Woods tail-chasing, presented as some kind of oracular strategic counsel. I've added a couple of explanatory remarks in brackets:

Maqdisi [an al-Qaeda poohbah] gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State’s fans, and al‑Qaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology [a 3rd year PhD student of another authority Woods cites elsewhere in his artile], read Maqdisi’s opinion on Henning’s status and thought it would hasten his and other captives’ death. “If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn’t be killed,” he told me, “I’d kiss my ass goodbye.”

Kassig’s death was a tragedy, but the plan’s success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world’s two largest jihadist organizations. It’s possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America’s two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment. [So bringing al-Queda and ISIS together is bad. Hold that thought....]

....Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims’ front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.

One way to un-cast the Islamic State’s spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. Al‑Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. [So, despite Woods earlier concerns, no one can really "match-make" al Qaeda and ISIS, because they immediately confront a myriad of irreconcilable philosophical and operational differences. Hold that thought, again....]

Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover. [So boots on ISIS ground might be good. Hold that thought....]

Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.

And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. [So, boots on ISIS ground is probably very bad. Hold that -- oh fuck it, these aren't thoughts at all, are they?]

jerseyhoya wrote:

swishnicholson wrote:

jerseyhoya wrote:I don't understand your complaint. It's not gratuitous horseshit or cherry-picking BS.

It's the central thesis of his piece that ISIS's goals, motivations, methods, etc. are radically different than anything we've come across previously, including from Al Qaeda.


The administration (or at least the president) viewing ISIS as Al Qaeda Lite was wrong in many different ways and reflected confusion about the group and may have contributed to significant strategic errors in confronting the challenges it presents.

I admit sometimes I have trouble following drsmooth's complaints, but this one here is as clear as KY Jelly. I've helpfully split your response into three parts, the middle of which is true. The out-of-the-blue, out of context and irrelevantly cited "jayvee" comment is in fact gratuitous and cherry picking and doesn't relate to the central thesis (did you truly read the whole thing?) If you're going to do an overly long think-piece on the motives of ISIS and want to have it taken seriously, you need to do the work of actually representing the thought on its opponents in some depth as well, rather than just tossing potshots.

I understood the English of his complaint. I did not understand why he was making it. The author is addressing misconceptions about ISIS in the West and trying to explain, as he understands through his reporting, what its beliefs and aims are. Rather than offering a bland "Some people in the United States and Europe assert ISIS is just like Al Qaeda except less mature, or that its beliefs have no basis in Islamic teaching and history, and they are wrong" he quotes someone who has asserted these things. Someone important. The president.

jerseyhoya wrote:Rather than offering a bland "Some people in the United States and Europe assert ISIS is just like Al Qaeda except less mature, or that its beliefs have no basis in Islamic teaching and history, and they are wrong" he quotes someone who has asserted these things. Someone important. The president.

jerseyhoya wrote: If the groups were to become friendly with each other, rather than feuding with each other, they could marry ISIS's strengths (fanatical adherents in Western countries) with Al Qaeda's goals (killing Westerners in eye catching ways in the West). This would be bad.

- The author is making it pretty clear there is not some silver bullet solution to the current problem.