See my last post.

Rules of Engagement are established by the commander, but are developed by the commander and the JAG. They are legal restrictions on the application of violence.

Your last sentence is one that we struggled with on a daily basis. If you have a terrorist leader who is vulnerable, do you risk killing people around him who may be innocents or may be part of his group? Because the drone isn't going to tell you who is good and who is bad...it's a soda straw video feed...

The application of violence is much more discriminate in Afghanistan that it was in Vietnam; can't speak for Iraq because I was never there. Rules of engagement are pretty strict...when McChrystal was ISAF Commander, he basically constrained offensive air strikes and they could only be used in extremis.

dajafi wrote:I will admit to not having followed this super closely. But it seems to me that greater clarity and transparency around rules of engagement would both address some of these governance concerns and actually advance the, y'know, successful conduct of the war (or "war"). This all feels way too close to how we did things in Vietnam, where every killee was posthumously categorized as an enemy combatant and the result was both a hugely exaggerated sense of our success on the battlefield and a progressive loss of hearts and minds. Moral objections aside, my big concern about the drone program (and our interventions in general) is that it might be creating more enemies than its killing.

Always enjoy LG's posts because, like 98% of the other posters on this board, my lack of military experience makes me completely ignorant on how our military really works.

I actually learned something from the last two posts.

yeah, that was really great. I hope they don't send drones after LG now

Bucky wrote:yeah, that was really great. I hope they don't send drones after LG now

too busy swarming Dennis Rodman

I am here to serve my country and my people. Part of that is explaining how the military works, we do a terrible job explaining what we do and why we do it.

http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/drone ... drone.html

I'm not a big Mark Steyn fan, but this article shows a lot of the problems with the usage of drones. I always appreciate anyone dropping knowledge with a Panopitcon reference as well, I've felt our country has been leaning this way for quite some time.

Yeah, great stuff LG. Really appreciate the insight.

"You can arrive in your private jet at Kennedy Airport, take a private limousine and go straight to the shelter system and walk in the door and we've got to give you shelter."

Bloomberg is worried about those homeless billionaires abusing the system

Luzinski's Gut wrote:Counter-insurgency is very much like police work. John Paul Vann in Vietnam said it well, "the best weapon is a knife, then a gun." Why? Localized damage - almost to the individual level. Killing in counter-insurgency has to be localized as much as possible, especially in an honor based culture like the Pashtun...kill a man unjustly, and his entire family will come after you until you rectify the situation or you are dead.

Thanks for the insights, LG.

But isn't this a reason NOT to use drones since we are going to hit some civilians? I would have to think a culture like that would see a drone as a cowardly and unjust way to die, particularly to those who are completely innocent. Seems like a lot of lost hearts and minds. Ultimately, I think the only way to "win" the "war" is to win those hearts and minds..

Personally, I think our use of drones and airstrikes is counter-productive, however, they have saved a lot of friendly lives. This is the paradox within the paradox.

Martin Van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, has a very interesting story about how the British won in Northern Ireland against the IRA. He was talking with a British Army Colonel who had served multiple tours in NI, and said there were three major reasons why the British won that counter-insurgency. One, the British viewed Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and were not going to give it up because they were willing to fight and die for that ground. Two, the British Army and political leadership was willing to accept more casualties than the IRA because of the commitment to NI. Three, with rare exception, they always tried to de-escalate the situation instead of escalating the situation with the introduction of additional firepower.

Counter-insurgency is a series of paradoxes and counter-intuitive decisions. You can really start traveling down some rabbit holes if you aren't careful; overthinking is common.

Yes, the Pashtun culture is one where they see our use of drones, airstrikes and indirect fire as cowardly. Our focus is so tactical - we just keep killing "targets" - that we often miss the operational and strategic objectives associated with this style of warfare. I'm coming around to the conclusion that insurgencies either have to be fought in two manners - one, you annihilate the enemy early and with extremely violent measures. This approach only works after you've been attacked - such as 9/11 - and it has to be very quickly accomplished, within 72-96 hours. The second way is that you take the Roman/British Imperial model - rent your forces, buy off those who can be bought off, and then kill the leadership of your adversary. It'll be cheaper in the long run, both in blood and treasure. Both approaches require leadership with balls and who don't really care about media or political blowback, which means you won't see either approach occur in the U.S. for quite some time, if ever.

I can only say this with certainty - the way we've conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should never be used as case studies for the future.

Monkeyboy wrote:

Luzinski's Gut wrote:Counter-insurgency is very much like police work. John Paul Vann in Vietnam said it well, "the best weapon is a knife, then a gun." Why? Localized damage - almost to the individual level. Killing in counter-insurgency has to be localized as much as possible, especially in an honor based culture like the Pashtun...kill a man unjustly, and his entire family will come after you until you rectify the situation or you are dead.

Thanks for the insights, LG.

But isn't this a reason NOT to use drones since we are going to hit some civilians? I would have to think a culture like that would see a drone as a cowardly and unjust way to die, particularly to those who are completely innocent. Seems like a lot of lost hearts and minds. Ultimately, I think the only way to "win" the "war" is to win those hearts and minds..

Luzinski's Gut wrote:Personally, I think our use of drones and airstrikes is counter-productive, however, they have saved a lot of friendly lives. This is the paradox within the paradox.

Martin Van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, has a very interesting story about how the British won in Northern Ireland against the IRA. He was talking with a British Army Colonel who had served multiple tours in NI, and said there were three major reasons why the British won that counter-insurgency. One, the British viewed Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and were not going to give it up because they were willing to fight and die for that ground. Two, the British Army and political leadership was willing to accept more casualties than the IRA because of the commitment to NI. Three, with rare exception, they always tried to de-escalate the situation instead of escalating the situation with the introduction of additional firepower.

Counter-insurgency is a series of paradoxes and counter-intuitive decisions. You can really start traveling down some rabbit holes if you aren't careful; overthinking is common.

Yes, the Pashtun culture is one where they see our use of drones, airstrikes and indirect fire as cowardly. Our focus is so tactical - we just keep killing "targets" - that we often miss the operational and strategic objectives associated with this style of warfare. I'm coming around to the conclusion that insurgencies either have to be fought in two manners - one, you annihilate the enemy early and with extremely violent measures. This approach only works after you've been attacked - such as 9/11 - and it has to be very quickly accomplished, within 72-96 hours. The second way is that you take the Roman/British Imperial model - rent your forces, buy off those who can be bought off, and then kill the leadership of your adversary. It'll be cheaper in the long run, both in blood and treasure. Both approaches require leadership with balls and who don't really care about media or political blowback, which means you won't see either approach occur in the U.S. for quite some time, if ever.

I can only say this with certainty - the way we've conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should never be used as case studies for the future.

No quarrel with your operational assessment LG, but the element that recurrently intrudes in the American scheme of things is commitment to a government rooted in a Constitution - and a Constitution that practically insists on multiple avenues of procedural interrogation (which amounts to a form of self-reflection, of "conscience"), prospective, concurrent, & retrospective.

Balls isn't all our leadership requires. In the way we've chosen to go about things (a way that, if we ARE exceptional, is a fundamental element of our uniqueness) "not caring about media or political blowback" is essentially a non sequitur

Tomas Perez nominated to be Labor Secretary

what, the h

will teach everyone how to get jam jobs

Monkeyboy wrote:will teach everyone how to get jam jobs

sweet

drsmooth wrote:Tomas Perez nominated to be Labor Secretary

what, the h

Massive increase in government subsidies for shaving cream pie manufacturing

Hey LG....those drones...are they hemi-powered???

dajafi wrote:
edit: I actually owe thanks to Wizlah for this--if he didn't re-tweet Billy Bragg opining about Chavez, I wouldn't have seen any of his attempts to defend that goon.

In fairness, I RT'd that particular line, because he seemed to be acknowledging that there was more to the chavez story than 'yay, chavez'. And Bragg is not in the same category as the likes of Pilger - he's usually prepared to weigh arguments on evidence.

I can't speak authoritatively about Chavez, but I find it hard to understand why the man was lionised amongst some in the left for siding with Ahmadinejad, and his support of Morales apparently left a lot to be desired (Grannywiz can speak with some authority on Bolivia, and recently commented that Morales is slipping into proper Mugabe territory, which is no good for anyone). It stank of the standard 'enemy is my enemy' bullshit, and whilst I can understand the point from a purely practical point of view, you can end up in bed with some pretty vile bedfellows. The Guardian did a pretty good column describing him first and foremost as a pragmatist, who'd done a fair bit to improve the lot of the poor in the short term, but fuck all to deal with the infrastructural problems of the country, leaving it in the shit when he went. Even then, this piece by Tariq Ali makes a valid point:

"But he leaves behind a very changed society in which the poor felt they had an important stake in the government. There is no other explanation for his popularity"

Except, presumably, for any jewish folk he did for.

I think there's something to the point that he was part of a generation of south american leaders who more successfully contested intervention from the US. Again, there's something to be said for that.

Luzinski's Gut wrote:Martin Van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, has a very interesting story about how the British won in Northern Ireland against the IRA. He was talking with a British Army Colonel who had served multiple tours in NI, and said there were three major reasons why the British won that counter-insurgency. One, the British viewed Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and were not going to give it up because they were willing to fight and die for that ground. Two, the British Army and political leadership was willing to accept more casualties than the IRA because of the commitment to NI. Three, with rare exception, they always tried to de-escalate the situation instead of escalating the situation with the introduction of additional firepower.

LG, I'm curious as to how the British Army was viewed to have won a victory in Northern Ireland - is this from a fairly strictly defined militry point of view? I know you're better read on these things, and more to the point, you'll have had the time to review stuff which has been written more recently about the North, but as I understand it, the IRA remained very capable from an operational point of view up to and beyond the Good Friday Agreement. The most significant operation which comes to mind was the bombing of the City of London in 1996, which cost the UK economy a fair whack of cash, and has been frequently associated with the UK government reconvening all party ceasefire talks whilst the IRA were still armed. That was followed later in the year by the Manchester bombing, and there seemed to be several fairly extensive bombing campaigns run in the UK throughout 1996 and 1997.

It's hard to view the end result of the peace process as anything other than a win for republicans. The principles of the Good Friday Agreement clearly acknowledge that although the majority of the population wished to stay within the UK, those who wished a United Ireland were well within their rights to do so. They repealed the govt of Ireland 1920 act, and the mechanisms and principle of self-determination put in place by the Good Friday Agreement ultimately mean that if enough folk in the 6 counties want Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic, they can do so. (As an aside, given all the hoopla I've been reading about the referendum here in Scotland in 2014, I'm somewhat amazed that more of the yes campaign haven't pointed out that another part of the UK is legally within it's rights to do fuck off to another nation if it so wishes. Not quite the same as an independent scotland, but the key there is the principle of self-determination).

A republican now looking at the UK would have a hearty chuckle. If they win the argument with their fellow countrymen, they get a united ireland. Plus, the process of talks and negotiation led to the referenda on the devolution of powers to scottish and welsh parliaments in 1997. Had the British Government truly been committed to Northern Ireland, there' s no way they would have given an inch to further talks with the IRA, because what has resulted is the antithesis of that committment: a union threatened by fragmentation, relying solely on political process to hold it together.

I'm 15 years gone from Ireland this week. I never imagined in those 15 years I'd be voting on the independence of Scotland. Seems to me that the IRA gets the last laugh.

No way mange....nu-cu-lur powered.

Most have turbofans in reality

Bucky wrote:Hey LG....those drones...are they hemi-powered???