dajafi wrote:I trust that if there's a true differentiation between "the Taliban," religious fanatics who are driven by ideology, and the majority of Afghanis who are currently trying to kill American soldiers, we can identify and exploit those differences through more cost-effective and probably more effective period than fighting a war in which the commitment we're willing to make falls far, far short of what "victory" will require.

Think about how crazy and arrogant this is: we are trying to both win a military struggle and perform the Triple Lindy of nation-building halfway around the world, without a draft or general societal mobilization of any kind or even a tax increase. It won't work because it can't work. Which isn't to say that what we want to see happen there isn't important, or even that it was a bad idea in the first place--just that the world has changed, so our approach should change.

More broadly, we need to get out of the habit of thinking we can and somehow should solve every foreign policy problem with force. It goes against our best traditions, it's horribly unfair to the military community which bears all the pain, and it's doing more than anything else to bankrupt us. I'm no pacifist, but this isn't rational.

These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressively, they wilt be revolutionary to our effectiveness. We must do things dramatically differently -- even uncomfortably differently -- to change how we operate, and also how we think. Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force, and how we partner with the Afghans. Conventional wisdom is not sacred; security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population.

.....

Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, de-centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift in priorities.

kruker wrote:

These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressively, they wilt be revolutionary to our effectiveness. We must do things dramatically differently -- even uncomfortably differently -- to change how we operate, and also how we think. Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force, and how we partner with the Afghans. Conventional wisdom is not sacred; security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population.

.....

Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, de-centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift in priorities.

Whether it's possible for the military to carry out nation building is a valid concern, but I'm of the mindset that after all this time of operating under a strategy that was doomed to fail, we might as well try one that has a chance to succeed.

jeff2sf wrote:Ok, so just to be clear, you're against every troop outside of the US, and this is just a convenient place for you to get on your soap box. I can dig it. A peace-loving conservative.

jeff2sf wrote:Werthless, what is so hard about doing what the general recommends for one year, assessing, and then pulling out if things aren't going as well?

Were you against the surge? Do I seem that bloodthirsty to you?